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Soft Law Before the European Courts:
Discovering a ‘common pattern’?
Mariolina Eliantonio * and Oana Stefan **
I. Setting the scene
About 25 years ago, Francis Snyder noted that rules of conduct that have no
legally binding force may nevertheless have legal and practical effects in the
European legal order.1 Boosted by institutional support enshrined in initiatives
such as the Commission White Paper on Governance, the Lisbon Strategy, and
Europe 2020, ‘soft law’ instruments are now present in nearly every European
Union (EU) policy. As expected, much was written on the use of soft law by the
EU,2 on Member States’ compliance with soft law provisions,3 and, most of all,
on the desirability of the use of soft law instruments in the process of European
integration.4 Authors have retained a series of ‘virtues’ for soft law instruments.
Cheap, fast, and flexible, soft law can be a catalyst for creating the premises
of successful international cooperation;5 it is ideally suited to deal with
the complexity of European affairs and their diversity,6 to regulate sensitive
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1 F Snyder, ‘Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community’ in S Martin (ed.), The
Construction of Europe (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), 198.
2 See eg in the field of social policy, D M Trubek and L G Trubek, ‘Hard and Soft Law in the
Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the Open Method of Co-ordination’ (2005) 11(3)
European Law Journal, 343–64; K Jacobsson, ‘Between Deliberation and Discipline: Soft
Governance in EU Employment Policy’ in U Morth (ed.), Soft Law in Governance and
Regulation: An Interdisciplinary Analysis (Cheltenham: Edward Edgar, 2004).
3 See eg G Falkner and others (eds.), Complying with Europe: EU Harmonisation and Soft Law in the
Member States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
4 J Klabbers, ‘The Undesirability of Soft Law’ (1998) 67(4) Nordic Journal of International Law, 381–
91; K A Armstrong, ‘The Character of EU Law and Governance: From “Community Method” to
New Modes of Governance’ (2011) 64(1) Current Legal Problems, 179–214; C Scott, ‘Governing
Without Law or Governing Without Government? New-ish Governance and the Legitimacy of the
EU’ (2009) 15(2) European Law Journal, 160–73.
5 W Reinicke and J M Witte, ‘Interdependence, Globalization, and Sovereignty: the Role of Non-
Binding Legal Accords’ in D Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding
Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 76.
6 A Schäfer, ‘A New Form of Governance? Comparing the Open Method of Co-Ordination to
Multilateral Surveillance by the IMF and the OECD’, (2006) 13(1) Journal of European Public Policy, 84.
 The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
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sectors,7 and address situations where swift action is imperative;8 to help with the
implementation of EU hard law9 while avoiding infringement proceedings;10 and
to enhance openness requirements now enshrined in Article 15 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the EU (TFEU).11 Similarly, deficiencies of soft law have been
thoroughly highlighted, starting with a notorious absence of legitimacy safe-
guards12 and an ‘extreme lack of transparency’13 in the adoption procedures,
which would enhance the discretion of the EU institutions to the detriment of
Member State competences,14 would reduce the role of the European Parliament
in EU decision making,15 failing at the same time to ensure proper consultations
with the stakeholders.16 Furthermore, it has been considered that, absent legally
binding force, the legal effects of soft law cannot be clearly determined,17 which in
turn hampers legal certainty. All these deficiencies show that soft law might be at
odds with the rule of law itself, a value on which the EU is founded, according to
Article 2 of the Treaty of European Union (TEU).
Such problems are highly salient given the important effects that soft law has
for individuals and Member States. The interpretative communications of the
Commission were found to constitute a source of doctrine, to guide public
7 D Hodson and I Maher, ‘Soft Law and Sanctions: Economic Policy Co-ordination and Reform of
the Stability and Growth Pact’ (2004) 11(5) Journal of European Public Policy, 810–11.
8 M Cini, ‘The Soft Law Approach: Commission Rule-Making in the EU’s State Aid Regime’,
(2001) 8(2) Journal of European Public Policy, 194; H A Cosma and RWhish, ‘Soft Law in the Field of
EU Competition Policy’, (2003) 14(1) European Business Law Review, 33.
9 E Korkea-aho, ‘EU Soft Law in Domestic Legal Systems: Flexibility and Diversity Guaranteed?’
(2009) 16(3) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 276; J Scott ‘In Legal Limbo:
Post-Legislative Guidance as a Challenge for European Administrative Law’ (2011) 48(2) Common
Market Law Review, 330; I von Homeyer, ‘Emerging Experimentalism in EU Environmental
Governance’ in C Sabel and C Zeitlin (eds), Experimentalist Governance in the EU: Towards a
New Architecture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
10 E Korkea-aho, ‘Watering Down the Court of Justice? The Dynamics between Network
Implementation and Article 258 TFEU Litigation’ (2013) 20(5) European Law Journal, 664–5.
11 In this context, Snyder talked about ‘regulation by publication’ and Hoffman about ‘regulation by
information’. Snyder (n 1), 199–201; H C H. Hofmann, ‘Negotiated and Non-Negotiated
Administrative Rule-Making: the Example of EC Competition Policy’ 43(1) (2006) Common
Market Law Review, 169–70.
12 See among others L A J Senden and A van den Brink, ‘Checks and Balances of Soft EU Rule-
Making’, (2002) PE 462.433, available at <http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2012/462433/IPOL-JURI_ET(2012)462433_EN.pdf> accessed
1 November 2018; Conseil d’État, Collection ‘Études et documents du Conseil d’État’, Rapport
Public 1992 (1993) Documentation française, 22–3, quoted in S Leclerc, ‘Les communications de la
Commission et le marché intérieur. A propos de l’arrêt rendu par la Cour de justice des
Communautés européennes le 10 Mars 1997 dans l’affaire C-57-95’, (1998) 34 CDE, 163.
13 L Senden, ‘Soft Post-Legislative Rulemaking: A Time for More Stringent Control’ (2012) 19(1)
European Law Journal, 65.
14 Snyder (n 1), 201–3.
15 Résolution du Parlement européen du 8 mai 1969, sur les actes de la collectivité des États membres
de la Communauté ainsi que les actes du Conseil non prévus par les traités adoptés à la suite du
rapport fait au nom de la Commission juridique par M. Burger [1969] OJ C63/18.
16 R Baldwin, Rules and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 284; Scott (n 9), 329–
55.
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administrations in their activities and, also, to provide a ‘magna carta’18 for
individuals, clarifying matters related to their rights and duties. An important
tool of EU administrative governance,19 soft law limits institutional discretion,
encouraging the administrators to take consistent decisions.20 Soft law can lead
to policy change but what is more, it induces subtler changes at the level of
discourse, understanding and policy principles.21 Hence, ‘formally non-binding
agreements can gradually become politically, socially and morally binding for
the actors involved’22 by the intervention of certain devices other than the legal
force of an act, such as those related to learning and peer pressure.
Contrasting such impact that soft law has in practice with its rule of law
deficiencies begs an important question: is soft law reviewed and applied by the
Court of Justice (the Court), just like any other EU act? Does the Court even
engage with such instruments? While some early studies have suggested that soft
law is not suitable for Court use,23 recent empirical work appears to suggest that
the approach of EU courts is largely dictated by the policy area and the par-
ticular features of the soft law employed. The EU courts make extensive use of
soft law in sectors such as competition and state aid,24 yet fail to engage with
instruments issued from Open Method of Coordination (OMC) processes
related to macroeconomic and employment policy coordination25 with soft
law having some impact on adjudication in the context of implementation of
the Water Framework Directive.26 Soft law is not systematically reviewed by the
Court of Justice, due to a particularly rigid understanding of the notion of legal
effects, which made academics and practitioners advocate for a more vigorous
engagement with soft law.27 At the same time, the Court is adopting a rather
unclear view in its preliminary references, by imposing duties on national courts
18 N Tornberg, ‘The Commission’s Communications on the General Good—Magna Carta or Law-
Making?’ (1999) 10(1–2) European Business Law Review, 27.
19 H Hofmann, ‘Administrative Governance in State aid Policy’ in H Hofmann and A H Türk (eds),
EU Administrative Governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006), 196–9.
20 Cini (n 8), 194.
21 Jacobsson (n 2), 89.
22 K Jacobsson, ‘Soft Regulation and the Subtle Transformation of States: the Case of EU
Employment Policy’ (2004) 14(4) Journal of European Social Policy, 359.
23 C M Chinkin, ‘The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law’
(1989) 38(4) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 862–5; J Klabbers, ‘The
Redundancy of Soft Law’ (1996) 65(2) Nordic Journal of International Law, 167; Klabbers (n 4), 381.
24 O Stefan, Soft Law in Court: Competition Law, State Aid and the Court of Justice of the European
Union (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2013).
25 S Smismans, ‘From Harmonization to Co-ordination? EU Law in the Lisbon Governance
Architecture’ (2011) 18(4) Journal of European Public Policy, 504; T Hervey, ‘Adjudicating in the
Shadow of the Informal Settlement?: The Court of Justice of the European Union, “New
Governance” and Social Welfare’ (2010) 63(1) Current Legal Problems, 92.
26 Korkea-aho (n 10), 649. On reconceptualizing the role of courts in a new governance context, see
also E Korkea-aho, Adjudicating New Governance: Deliberative Democracy in the European Union
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2015).
27 Scott (n 9), 331–2.
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to take EU soft law into consideration,28 while duly noting that such instru-
ments cannot be binding at the national level.29
II. Our contribution
The contribution of this special section to the analysis of the way in which EU
courts engage with soft law instruments is threefold. First, it expands the ambit
of research on soft law by looking at different policy areas, such as monetary, tax,
environmental, consumer protection, energy, and neighbourhood policy. As
expected, the use of soft law in policy areas is widespread, and its existence is
acknowledged by the European Courts. In a favourable institutional setting,
judicial acknowledgement of such instruments can determine their hardening,
as documented in the field of taxation by Beckers. Yet, the European Courts seem
reluctant to employ the term of ‘soft law’, as confirmed by Korkea-aho’s research
on the Curia database.
Secondly, mindful that soft law comes in an ‘infinite variety’,30 we made a
conscious choice to deal with a representative mix of soft law forms. In the EU
context, soft law consists of recommendations, opinions, and other instruments
not mentioned in Article 288 TFEU such as communications, notices, or guide-
lines, although the institutions and the agencies can get quite creative with the
terminologies employed. With authors suggesting various taxonomies, we retain
here Senden’s three categories, ordered on functional and purposive criteria:
preparatory and informative; interpretative and decisional; formal and informal
steering instruments. The first category includes acts that put forward various
proposals for future action but, with the exception of the White Papers, do not
establish rules of conduct and one may consider that they can hardly fit in the
soft law definition.31 Vianello identifies, in the neighborhood policy, a series of
progress reports, action plans, strategy papers, that can sometimes have both
preparatory and rule-making functions. Conversely, Van Schagen notes that
Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs), which are extensive reports accompany-
ing planned EU measures, are preparatory in nature and cannot even be con-
sidered soft law. The second category includes those instruments that ‘restate or
summarise the interpretation that should be given to EU law provisions’32
(interpretative) and those indicating ‘the way in which an EU institution will
apply EU law provisions in an individual case where it has implementing and
28 Case C-322/88, Salvatore Grimaldi v Fonds des maladies professionnelles ECLI:EU:C:1989:646.
29 Case C-526/14, Tadej Kotnik and Others v Državni zbor Republike Slovenije ECLI:EU:C:20
16:570.
30 R Baxter, ‘International Law in “Her Infinite Variety”’ (1980) 29(4) International and Comparative
Law Quarterly, 549.
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discretionary powers’33 (decisional). Such interpretative instruments are prom-
inent in the field of environmental regulation, for instance, as documented by
Eliantonio, where various guidance documents, guidelines, communications,
and working documents aim to explain hard law obligations and how imple-
mentation of hard law should be carried out. Also in Monetary Policy, Alberti
identified the Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework as a form of interpret-
ative and decisional instrument. The third category comprises those legal and/or
political instruments with the objective of steering or guiding action in a non-
legally binding way by laying down ‘new rules independently of an existing legal
framework, or . . . adopted in the context of such a framework, prior to, sim-
ultaneous with or subsequent to legislation’.34 In this regard, Beckers analyses the
Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, and the potential of steering instru-
ments to become legally binding through institutional practice. Stefan and Petri
show the importance of steering instruments issued by agencies, such as ACER,
in the elaboration of hard law.
The present contributions add new elements to this list. Alberti identifies the
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) Programme, which is contained in a
simple press release, as a hybrid measure with both steering and decisional
elements, at it is aimed at steering financial markets and at the same times
indicates what the European Central Bank is ready to do to achieve this end.
Van Schagen adds the interesting case of the EU impact assessment regime.
While Regulatory Impact Assessments are identified by Van Schagen as non-
law, the Better Regulation Guidelines,35 appear to be a form of constitutional soft
law, containing rules to ensure the quality of RIAs. Korkea-aho shows that the
Courts acknowledge the existence of different categories of soft law, while at-
taching different effects to different types of instruments. However, we did not
find any evidence that the other EU institutions recognize such taxonomies, and
the issue remains open for further research.
Third, and most importantly, this special section contributes to the literature
by further exploring substantive issues pertaining to the status and effects of soft
law, as well as to its impact on rule of law values. The remainder of this editorial
will briefly outline our conclusions with regard to the legal and practical effects
of soft law and their relevance before the European courts (Section III); the
justiciability of soft law (Section IV); and the interplay between soft law and
general principles of law (Section V). We will conclude with some thoughts on
the viability of the hard law–soft law divide in the context of an increasing
judicial recourse to soft law (Section VI).
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid 157.
35 Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2017) 350, 7 July 2017 (Better Regulation
Guidelines).
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III. The effects of soft law
As stated in the definition of soft law employed in this special issue, soft law can
have both practical and legal effects, even though, according to Article 288
TFEU, soft law is deprived of legally binding force. The courts have acknowl-
edged binding legal effects to soft law in limited circumstances: where soft law is
construed as introducing a new obligation,36 where a soft law measure states the
way in which an EU institution intends to exercise its discretion,37 or, as far as
Member States are concerned, where the soft law measure at stake has been
produced in cooperation with the Member States.38 Failing this binding thresh-
old however, Courts are reluctant to give much weight to the effects that soft law
can entail—both from a legal and practical point of view.
The literature has listed a number of legal or practical effects that soft law can
have, although the line dividing the two is blurred.39 For Snyder legal effects can
consist of providing a normative framework for future negotiations and for
potential arguments or conflicts; binding the enacting institution and also the
institutions which are parties to an inter-institutional agreement; concretizing
the duty of institutional cooperation; creating the expectation that the enacting
institution will comply with the rules it laid down in a soft law instrument;
producing a stand-still effect on the non-conforming conduct of a state or
institutions; and influencing the legal rights and obligations of third parties.
Soft law can impact on national and European legislation by expressing general
principles of EU law, being part of the acquis communautaire, interpreting hard
law provisions, and serving as a legal basis for the enactment of national legis-
lation. In a court of law, the effects of soft law include, among others: providing
the basis for judicial review; being the object of an action for annulment; being
used in litigation by the parties to a trial; and serving as an aid in the interpret-
ation of hard law provisions.40
One of the most relevant effects of soft law in litigation is its use as an
interpretative tool. Eliantonio shows, however, that, even if the Court relies
on soft law to a certain extent when interpreting environmental hard law, it is
not a significantly authoritative interpretation source. This limited use of soft
was discovered equally when EU secondary law foresees the adoption of soft law
and when soft law is free-standing and not linked to any provision of EU
36 Case C-366/88, France v Commission (Internal Instructions) ECLI:EU:C:1990:348, at para. 23.
37 Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P, C-208/02 P, and C-213/02 P, Dansk
Rørindustri and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2005:408, at para. 267.
38 Case C-311/94 Ijssel-Vliet Combinatie BV v Minister van Economische Zaken
ECLI:EU:C:1996:383, at para. 43.
39 See P Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?’, (1983) 77(3) The American
Journal of International Law, 415. Also, see Chinkin (n 23), 862–5.
40 This list of legal effects is provided in F Snyder, ‘Interinstitutional Agreements: Forms and
Constitutional Limitations’ in G Winter (ed.), Sources and Categories of European Union Law: A
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primary or secondary law. Such conclusions are interesting and suggest that the
Court indeed applies double standards: while it does not consider itself bound
by soft law, they urge national courts to take soft law into consideration when
judging cases. Notoriously, in Grimaldi, national courts were advised to ‘take
soft law into consideration’ with authors going as far as suggesting this obliga-
tion to be ‘reminiscent of Von Colson’.41
In order to bring clarity to this debate, Korkea-aho traces back Grimaldi
references in EU case law, investigating the legal effects which the European
courts attribute to EU soft law when soft law measures become relevant in
national litigation. She notes that the full extent of the wording ‘to take into
account’ is not clear, and potentially allows national courts to endow soft law
measures with far-reaching effects. Recent case law has not clarified this point
either, instead adding to the complexity when discussing the legal effects of soft
law, with national courts advised either that they ‘may’ or they ‘must’ take soft
law into account. In this regard, the nature of the soft law measure at stake
appears to play an important role: where a soft law measure is foreseen or
embedded in primary or secondary law, the Grimaldi obligation applies in
full. If instead the soft law instrument is not derived from primary or secondary
law, national courts may decide whether or not to take it into account.
The interplay between judicial acknowledgement of soft law and the practice
of the other EU institutions can lead to the hardening of these instruments, and
the creation of new obligations. Beckers draws on insights from the legalization
and juridification literatures to show how the Code of Conduct for Business
taxation became, throughout the years, hard law. While the Code of Conduct
was framed as a political commitment that should not be legally binding, it has
been treated by EU institutions and Member States as an obligation. It has
created legitimate expectations for individuals and was considered an integral
part of the acquis communautaire that needed to be implemented prior to EU
accession. In turn, the Court and the Commission have implicitly recognized
such effects for the Code. Specifically, while the Court of Justice has rejected
legal enforceability for the Code, it has employed it frequently in its state aid,
establishment, and services case law. The matter is highly topical, given the
current controversy with regard to tax rulings. As shown by Beckers, it is up
to the Court to endorse the strategy of the Commission and use the Code in
order to regulate taxation in Europe, or, conversely, practise judicial restraint
and establish some boundaries to the ever expansive reach of EU state aid law.
With regard to the practical effects of soft law, Van Schagen notes that the
2015 Better Regulation Guidelines aim at having a practical effect, as ‘they form
the basis of the evaluations of the RSB that are clearly meant to be followed’. It
41 A Arnull, ‘The Legal Status of Recommendations’ (1990) 15(4) European Law Review, 318; D
Chalmers and others, European Union Law: Texts and Materials (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010), 388.
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is argued that practical effect depends not only on the wording of the
Guidelines, but also on the corresponding guidance that the officials can
derive from them. The case study in consumer protection shows that there
are severe and persistent shortcomings of RIAs, which constitute breaches of
the Guidelines, and raises questions with regard to their effectiveness. This is
mainly because of a major weakness of the RIA regime: the guidance provided is
not always detailed enough and is sometimes ambiguous.
Vianello discusses important practical effects of EU soft law in the Pre-
Accession and Neighborhood policy. She argues that EU soft law in this field
can severely limit the freedom of third countries because the advantages of
compliance outweigh the costs of non-compliance and implementation mech-
anisms are foreseen whereby positive or negative sanctions can be imposed as a
result of a neighbouring state’s decision on whether to follow EU soft law or
not. Vianello goes so far as suggesting that ‘the legal freedom not to follow a
merely conditioning act is often a mere fiction’. The example of the ACER
opinion on the highly contested split of the bidding zone Austria–Germany–
Luxembourg documented by Stefan and Petri show that national authorities can
voluntarily implement soft law, which entails important consequences for the
stakeholders. Yet, neither ACER’s own Board of Appeal, nor the Court attach
any legal consequences to such voluntary compliance.42 Such a rigid attitude
towards the judicial recognition of effects entailed by soft law has important
consequences at the level of justiciability, as explained in the next section.
IV. The justiciability of soft law
The European Courts can be asked to review soft law following an action for
annulment pursuant to Article 263 TFEU. However, given (among others) the
lack of legally binding force and the ensuing unclear legal effects of soft law, the
availability of this avenue is rather limited. Both academics43 and practitioners44
have argued that the Court should relax its legal effects threshold in order to
allow judicial review of all types of EU acts, not only of hard law. Turk45
42 Decision of ACER’s Board of Appeal No A-001-2015 of 16 December 2015, available at
<https://www.acer.europa.eu/en/The_agency/Organisation/Board_of_Appeal/Decisions/238%20
A-001-2015%20BoA%20decision%20(non%20confidential%20version)%202112-2112.pdf>
accessed 1 November 2018; Case T-671/15 Energie-Control Austria für die Regulierung der
Elektrizitäts- und Erdgaswirtschaft (E-Control) v Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators
ECLI:EU:T:2016:626, at para. 48.
43 Scott (n 9), 329–55; O Stefan, ‘Helping Loose Ends Meet? The Judicial Acknowledgement of Soft
Law as a Tool of Multi-Level Governance’ (2014) 21(2) Maastricht Journal of European and
Comparative Law, 359–79.
44 Case C-16/16, Opinion of Advocate General Bobek, Kingdom of Belgium v European Commission
ECLI:EU:C:2017:959, at para. 110.
45 A Türk, ‘Liability and Accountability for Policies Announced to the Public and for Press Releases’
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suggested as alternatives the preliminary reference procedure and/or the pleas in
illegality under Article 277 TFEU, given that these two articles do not require a
reviewable act to produce ‘legal effects’. This special issue contributes to the
research on justiciability of soft law as it analyses, from the various perspectives
of different policy fields and instruments, all these avenues.
A first hurdle to justiciability is the so-called authorship criterion. Indeed,
under Articles 263 and 267 TFEU, in order to be reviewable, a measure needs to
be an act adopted by the European institutions. Eliantonio argues that guidance
documents which have been adopted jointly by the Commission and the
Member States will not meet this criterion, while Stefan and Petri note the
same with regard to instruments issued by networks of transmission system
operators for energy. Korkea-aho unpacks the same issue with regards to prelim-
inary references. In relation to validity challenges, the Court of Justice is likely to
only accept a reference concerning the validity of a soft law instrument insofar as
it is an act of the EU institutions. Both Eliantonio and Korkea-aho, however,
notice a more flexible attitude in recent case law. It is to be hoped that this trend
will be stabilized and that the European Courts will interpret this criterion
broadly enough to capture EU soft law that is the product of a cooperation
between European and national authorities.
A further significant hurdle to direct actions is that, following ERTA, review-
able acts must be ‘intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties’ ac-
cording to Article 263 TFEU and the Court of Justice’s case law.46 The Court
interprets this requirement to mean that soft law should produce legally binding
effects (see above Section III). Eliantonio notes that such a restrictive interpret-
ation entails a too limited judicial control of soft law measures in environmental
law. The E-Control case discussed by Stefan and Petri show that absent legally
binding effects, soft law issued by EU Agencies are neither internally reviewed
by the Board of Appeal, nor judicially reviewed by the ECJ, impacting nega-
tively on accountability. Interestingly, Alberti notes that in economic and mon-
etary policy cases the Court might decide differently on reviewability. In
Clearing Houses,47 the General Court admitted the review of a non-binding
policy of the European Central Bank on the ground that, in essence, Member
States were likely to follow and respect the European measure. Such an approach
shows an emphasis on the perception of the addressees of the measure which
differs remarkably from other policy fields. As noted by Alberti, in competition
law ‘the assumption usually goes the other way around, stating that national
authorities are not bound by soft law acts enacted by the Commission’. In
general, it can be concluded that the criterion of legal effects is far from clearly
Opportunities, available at <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecblegalconferenceproceed-
ings201712.en.pdf> accessed 1 November 2018, 43–58.
46 Case 22/70, Commission v Council ECLI:EU:C:1971:32, at para. 42.
47 Case T-496/11, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Central Bank
(ECB) ECLI:EU:T:2015:133, at para. 42.
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interpreted and applied by the European Courts. In light of the blurred line
between ‘introducing a new obligation’ (which is necessary for soft law to be
reviewable in court) and fleshing out an existing obligation, and in order to
foster both accountability and legal certainty, it is to be hoped that this criterion
will be interpreted in a more relaxed way in the future.
Most recently, after the present contributions were completed, Advocate
General Bobek suggested revising the test for the reviewability of soft law meas-
ures.48 He argued that the requirement of an act being ‘intended to produce
legal effects’ should be reconsidered in light of its unclear connotation, the
restrictive subsequent case law of the Court of Justice, and the proliferation
of soft law instruments in the past decades. Furthermore, comparative examin-
ation of supreme administrative jurisdictions showed also a trend towards
broader admissibility of challenges against soft law. In this light, the AG pro-
posed that the test for admissibility should be, in line with the original case law,
whether the challenged measure is capable of producing legal effects. Such ap-
proach would arguably remove the uncertainty surrounding the ‘intention’ of
the drafter of the rule (which was included in the original ERTA doctrine) and
the need for a measure to produce ‘binding’ legal effects (which was derived
from the post-ERTA case law). In essence, the AG pleaded for a much lower
admissibility threshold for soft law measures, but this was not followed by the
Court of Justice, which applied the orthodox criterion of a measure’s intention
to produce binding legal effects.49
A further complication with regard to a direct action against a soft law meas-
ure is represented by the criterion of ‘direct concern’ which is enshrined in
Article 263(4). The CJEU has consistently held that a measure is of direct
concern only if it affects the claimant’s legal position directly and leaves no
discretion to the addressees of the measure in relation to who is obliged to
implement the measure.50 Interestingly, Alberti shows how the European
courts have used this criterion (instead of the capacity of the soft law measure
to produce legal effects) to reject direct actions. In a case concerning a press
release on the Outright Monetary Transactions Programme in the framework of
EU Monetary Policy, both European courts dismissed the claim on grounds of
direct concern, holding that the soft law measure in question (a press release)
was not capable of directly affecting the applicants’ legal spheres.51 Should this
48 C-16/16 P, Opinion of Advocate General Bobek, Kingdom of Belgium v European Commission
ECLI:EU:C:2017:959.
49 C-16/16 P, Kingdom of Belgium v European Commission ECLI:EU:C:2018:79.
50 See also Case C-207/86, Asociación Profesional de Empresarios de Pesca Comunitarios (Apesco) v
Commission ECLI:EU:C:1988:200, at para. 12; Case C-417/04 P, Regione Siciliana v Commission
ECLI:EU:C:2006:282, at para. 28; Case C-69/69, SA Alcan Aluminium Raeren and others v
Commission ECLI:EU:C:1970:53, at para. 8; Case C-222/83, Municipality of Differdange and
Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1984:266, at para. 9.
51 Case T-492/12, Sven A. von Storch and others v ECB ECLI:EU:T:2013:702, at para. 38; Case C-
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be taken to mean that the Courts implicitly recognised that the press release was
in principle able to produce legal effects, hence it was a reviewable act, but not
on the specific applicant challenging it? As Alberti explains, this would have very
far-reaching consequences in the monetary field.
Moving from direct challenges under Article 263, Korkea-aho and Eliantonio
examine the potential for an indirect review of soft law, through a preliminary
question of validity under Article 267 TFEU. This route is potentially available
for those who challenge soft law, as there is no need to prove the existence of
legal effects. In Grimaldi, the Court affirmed its ‘jurisdiction to give a prelim-
inary ruling on the validity and interpretation of all acts of the institutions of the
Community without exception’,52 and restated this more recently in Belgium v
Commission.53
The findings of this special issue show that judicial review of soft law is
limited, but not impossible. Preliminary references and indirect actions are
important remedies, through which Courts can control the legality of soft law
instruments. However, whether such avenues offer effective judicial protection is
a wholly different matter, and the answer to this question depends mostly on the
positioning with regard to the debate around the existence of a ‘complete system
of legal remedies’ within the Treaties.54 Whatever the perspective adopted on
this matter, this special issue acknowledges that modern ills of regulation cannot
always be solved through judicial intervention. There is of course a limit to what
courts can do, given the high degree of specialization and technical expertise of
many of the soft law instruments discussed by our articles. However, we agree
with Scott and Sturm that courts can be at least the catalysts of a more prin-
cipled approach towards new governance mechanisms, an aspect to which this
editorial now turns.55
V. The interplay between soft law and general principles of law
The debate on whether the use of EU soft law in court fosters or undermines
general principles of law is far from settled. While earlier works stressed the
undesirability of soft law,56 more recent accounts showed that the EU courts
legitimize the recourse to soft law by grounding Commission competition and
52 Case C-322/88, Salvatore Grimaldi v Fonds des maladies professionnelles ECLI:EU:C:1989:646, at
para. 8.
53 Case C-16/16 P, Kingdom of Belgium v European Commission ECLI:EU:C:2018:79, at para. 44.
54 See in this regard the notorious contradiction between the Advocate General and the Court in
UPA: Case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council of the European Union
ECLI:EU:C:2002:462; Case C-50/00 P, Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Unión de Pequeños
Agricultores v Council of the European Union ECLI:EU:C:2002:197.
55 J Scott and S P Sturm, ‘Courts as Catalysts: Rethinking the Judicial Role in New Governance’
(2007) 13(3) Columbia Journal of European Law, 565.
56 Klabbers (n 4), 381–91.
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state aid guidance in hard principles drawn from the common constitutional
traditions of the Member States.57
In this special issue, Van Schagen shows the potential of soft law to contribute
to principled decision making at the European level. She argues that drafting
Regulatory Impact Assessments in light of the Better Regulation Guidelines and
following the Opinions of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board enhance the potential
for the final hard law instrument adopted to comply with good administration
(in particular the duty to state reasons) and proportionality. Consequently, in
the case of badly drafted RIAs, the Guidelines might inform judicial review.
However, Van Schagen concludes that the Courts are not the appropriate fora for
such analysis. Engaging with the Guidelines would exceed the competences of
the Court of Justice of the European Union, as this might entail qualitative
assessments. In these circumstances, Van Schagen considers that a better forum
for review of RIAs would be the Regulatory Scrutiny Board.
Vianello discusses whether the use of EU Pre-Accession and Neighborhood
policy soft law by the European courts undermines general principles of law.
While she explains that the relevant soft law instruments may have very signifi-
cant legal and practical effects for third countries and their nationals, the Court
of Justice has consistently failed to recognize that the relevant soft law measures
could entail legitimate expectations for applicants, or a right to require a certain
course of action from the EU institutions. This, in Vianello’s view, fails to
acknowledge the reality of the use of soft law in this policy area. Interestingly,
she argues that the European Ombudsman could be regarded as an adequate
alternative forum to force the EU to uphold a more principled approach in its
external activities.
Alberti also discusses the relation between soft law and general principles of
law, specifically the principle of institutional balance. He argues that the judicial
‘handling’ of EU soft law in the field of Monetary Policy has endangered the
institutional balance in the EU legal system, because it has given the chance to
the European Central Bank to detail, during the judicial proceedings, the details
of implementation of a soft law measure. With regards to institutional balance,
Stefan and Petri illustrate, with an energy case study, an underlying tension of
the Meroni doctrine.58 Following a strict application of this doctrine with re-
gards to the limits of what can be delegated, ACER was only given soft powers
to regulate mostly through non-legally binding instruments. Yet, given that
neither the Courts nor the Board of Appeal recognize legal effect to such in-
struments, they are hardly ever reviewed, undermining accountability and in-
stitutional balance, which is another tenet of the Meroni doctrine.
57 Stefan (n 24).
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VI. Conclusion: embracing hybridity
Soft law is present in virtually all policy fields in which the EU operates and is
more and more often inextricably linked to hard law. It serves to set the course
of action of EU and national institutions alike, thereby avoiding arbitrary
behaviour, and to interpret hard law provisions in a legislative context of an
interestingly technical and technological nature. Is it still viable to strictly sep-
arate hard law from soft law, as if they were two ontologically distinct entities?
The literature has already given a negative answer to this question, with authors
arguing that law should be either seen as a continuum, varying from non-law
through soft law to hard law forms,59 and that regulation is inherently hybrid,
including both soft and hard law features.60 In these circumstances, is it still
sustainable for European courts to deny judicial review of soft law on the
grounds that they do not produce legally binding effects?
In the words of Advocate General Bobek, soft law measures contain ‘a type of
imperfect norm: on the one hand, they clearly have the normative ambition of
inducing compliance on the part of their addressees. On the other hand, no
instruments of direct coercion are attached to them’.61 The articles collected in
this special issue confirm that soft law measures do not only have the ‘normative
ambition’ of inducing compliance, but often represent the ‘no other choice’
option in terms of compliance, from the perspective of EU and national autho-
rities. Furthermore, as shown by Beckers, soft law can acquire binding features
through institutional practice. In such circumstances, it becomes untenable to
keep on denying that the legislative framework is defined by the combination of
hard and soft law. While the European Courts ought, therefore, to embrace
hybridity, it is necessary at the same time to re-think basic notions of judicial
review, relaxing the straight jacket of binding legal effects. Moreover, embracing
hybridity ought not to mean a new chance for EU institutions to by-pass the
basic tenets of the rule of law, including transparency, reason giving, and ac-
countability, but acknowledging that soft law is here to stay and needs to be both
used and controlled by the European courts. This requires a more streamlined
approach to procedural requirements concerning the adoption of soft law in-
struments, which in turn might be of use for the Courts when exercising judicial
review.
59 K W Abbott and D Sindal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ (2000) 54(3)
International Organization, 421; F Terpan, ‘Soft Law in the European Union—The Changing
Nature of EU Law’ (2015) 21(1) European Law Journal, 68-96.
60 G De Búrca and J. Scott, ‘Introduction: New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism’ in G De
Búrca and J Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2006); D M Trubek and L G Trubek, ‘New Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementarity,
Rivalry and Transformation’ (2007) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law, 539.
61 C-16/16 P, Opinion of Advocate General Bobek delivered on 12 December 2017, Kingdom of
Belgium v European Commission ECLI:EU:C:2017:959, at para. 86.
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